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Several commentators have suggested that the UK’s decision to leave the European Union
illustrates that governments must pay greater attention to the ‘losers’ from globalisation. Kevin
O’Rourke argues that this fact has long been obvious. As the historical record demonstrates plainly
and repeatedly, too much market and too little state invites a backlash. He writes that markets and
states should be viewed as political complements, not substitutes.
It has recently become commonplace to argue that globalisation can leave people behind, and that
this can have severe political consequences. Since 23 June, this has even become conventional
wisdom. While I welcome this belated acceptance of the blindingly obvious, I can’t but help feeling a little frustrated,
since this has been self-evident for many years now. What we are seeing, in part, is what happens to conventional
wisdom when, all of a sudden, it finds that it can no longer dismiss as irrelevant something that had been staring it in
the face for a long time.
The main point of my 1999 book with Jeff Williamson, Globalization and History, was that globalisation produces
both winners and losers, and that this can lead to an anti-globalisation backlash. We argued this based on late-19th
century evidence. Then, the main losers from trade were European landowners, who found themselves competing
with an elastic supply of cheap New World land. The result was that in Germany and France, Italy and Sweden, the
move towards ever-freer trade that had been ongoing for several years was halted, and replaced by a shift towards
protection that benefited not only agricultural interests, but industrial ones as well. Meanwhile, across the Atlantic,
immigration restrictions were gradually tightened, as workers found themselves competing with European migrants
coming from ever-poorer source countries.
While Jeff and I were firmly focused on economic history, we were writing with half an eye on the ‘trade and wages’
debate that was raging during the 1990s. There was an obvious potential parallel between 19th-century European
landowners, newly exposed to competition with elastic supplies of New World land, and late 20th-century OECD
unskilled workers, newly exposed to competition with elastic supplies of Asian, and especially Chinese, labour. In
our concluding chapter, we wrote that:
“A focus of this book has been the political implications of globalization, and the lessons are sobering. Politicians,
journalists, and market analysts have a tendency to extrapolate the immediate past into the indefinite future, and
such thinking suggests that the world is irreversibly headed toward ever greater levels of economic integration. The
historical record suggests the contrary… unless politicians worry about who gains and who loses, they may be
forced by the electorate to stop efforts to strengthen global economy links, and perhaps even to dismantle them…
The globalization experience of the Atlantic economy prior to the Great War speaks directly and eloquently to
globalization debates today. Economists who base their views of globalization, convergence, inequality, and policy
solely on the years since 1970 are making a great mistake. We hope that this book will help them to avoid that
mistake— or remedy it.”
This time it is not different
You may argue that the economic history of a century ago is irrelevant – after all, this time is different. But ever
since the beginning of the present century, at the very latest, it has been obvious that the politics of globalisation
today bears a family resemblance to that of 100 years ago.
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It was as long ago as 2001 that Kenneth Scheve and Matthew Slaughter published an article finding that the so
called Heckscher-Ohlin logic did a pretty good job of explaining American attitudes towards trade – lower-skilled
workers were more protectionist. Later work extended this finding to the rest of the world. If the high skilled were
more favourably inclined towards free trade in all countries, this would not be consistent with Heckscher-Ohlin
theory, but that is not what the opinion survey evidence suggested – the Scheve-Slaughter finding held in rich
countries, but not in poor ones.
You may further argue that such political science evidence is irrelevant, or at least that conventional wisdom could
be forgiven for ignoring it. But by the first decade of the 21st century, again at the very latest, it was clear that these
forces could have tangible political effects. In 2005, a French referendum rejected the so-called ‘Constitutional
Treaty’ by a convincing margin. While the treaty itself was a technical document largely relating to decision-making
procedures inside the EU, the referendum campaign ended up becoming, to a very large extent, a debate about
globalisation in its local, European manifestation.
Opponents of the treaty pointed to the outsourcing of jobs to cheap labour competitors in Eastern Europe, and to the
famous Polish plumber. Predictably enough, professionals voted overwhelmingly in favour of the treaty, while blue-
collar workers, clerical workers and farmers rejected it. The net result was a clear rejection of the treaty.
Lessons not learned
Shamefully, the response was to repackage the treaty, give it a new name, and push it through regardless – a
shabby manoeuver that has done much to fuel Euroscepticism in France. There was of course no referendum on the
Lisbon Treaty in that country, but there was in Ireland in 2008. Once again, a clear class divide opened up, with rich
areas overwhelmingly supporting Lisbon, and poor areas overwhelmingly rejecting it. Survey evidence
commissioned afterwards by the Irish government suggested that what canvassers on the doorsteps had found was
indeed the case – hostility towards immigration in the poorer parts of Dublin was an important factor explaining the
“No” vote there.
For a long time, conventional wisdom ignored these rather large straws in the wind – after all, the Irish could always
be asked to vote again, while the French could always be told that they couldn’t vote again. And so the show could
go on. But now Brexit is happening, and the obvious cannot be ignored any longer.
Recent work suggests that exposure to Chinese import competition was a common factor in many British regions
that voted to leave the EU. If this finding survives the scholarly scrutiny that it deserves, it will hardly come as a
surprise. But it is nevertheless crucial, since these are precisely the kinds of regions that are voting for the National
Front in France. And unlike Britain, France is absolutely central to the European project.
What can be done? Great openness requires greater governments
This is where Dani Rodrik’s finding that more open states had bigger governments in the late 20th century comes in.
Dani – who was long ago asking whether globalisation had gone too far – argues that markets expose workers to
risk, and that government expenditure of various sorts can help protect them from those risks.
In a series of articles, Michael Huberman showed that this correlation between states and markets was present
before 1914 as well. Countries with more liberal trade policies tended to have more advanced social protections of
various sorts, and this helped maintain political support for openness.
Anti-immigration sentiment was clearly crucial in delivering an anti-EU vote in England. And if you talk to ordinary
people, it seems clear that competition for scarce public housing and other public services was one important factor
behind this. But if the problem was a lack of services per capita, then there were two possible solutions: reduce the
number of ‘capitas’ by restricting immigration; or increase the supply of services. It is astonishing in retrospect how
few people argued strongly for more services rather than fewer people.
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Concluding remarks and possible solutions
If the Tories had really wanted to maintain support for the EU, investment in public services and public housing
would have been the way to do it. If these had been elastically supplied, that would have muted the impression that
there was a zero-sum competition between natives and immigrants. It wouldn’t have satisfied the xenophobes, but
not all anti-immigrant voters are xenophobes. But of course the Tories were never going to do that, at least not with
George Osborne at the helm.
If the English want continued Single Market access, they will have to swallow continued labour mobility. There are
complementary domestic policies that could help in making that politically feasible. We will have to wait and see
what the English decide. But there are also lessons for the 27 remaining EU states (28 if, as I hope, Scotland
remains a member). Too much market and too little state invites a backlash. Take the politics into account, and it
becomes clear (as Dani Rodrik has often argued) that markets and states are complements, not substitutes.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article originally appeared at VoxEU and forms a chapter in the VoxEU ebook, Brexit Beckons: Thinking
ahead by leading economists. It gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and
Policy, nor of the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: Bankenverband (CC-BY-SA-2.0)
Shortened URL for this post: http://bit.ly/2aPzRhu
 _________________________________
About the author
Kevin O’Rourke – University of Oxford
Kevin O’Rourke is Chichele Professor of Economic History at All Souls College, University of
Oxford, and Research Director at CEPR.
3/3
